I’m an advocate of plural AI: the broad dissemination and democratization of AI capabilities. That worries many AI safety thinkers, who would prefer a smaller set of models under tight control.
I believe the opposite is true. Concentration of power is the greatest risk. Plural AI can make us safer.
In the interview below with Superalignment, I make that case in more detail. Read the original feature here.
Reproduced with permission from Superalignment.
Plural AI: What Would Make a World of Many AIs Safe?
Technologist and author Ramez Naam on distributed cognitive power, the absence of natural monopolies in frontier intelligence, why defending critical infrastructure requires broad access, and what recursive constitutional conventions tell us about model safety.
By Superalignment team with Ramez Naam
November 2, 2026
Ramez Naam is a computer scientist, clean tech investor, and science fiction author. Drawing on family stories of life under an Egyptian dictatorship, thirteen years at Microsoft, and work across clean energy and software, his collaboration with Aligned investigates why pluralism beats centralized monopoly in frontier AI.
Five arguments from Ramez Naam

How does broad access to AI make the world more resilient?
“Democratization is the best tool that we have to give defenders access to tools to make their own sites more secure.”
Ramez Naam · In conversation with Aligned · Systemic resilience
What keeps frontier AI from becoming concentrated?
“Competition between multiple closed-weight operators is… substantially better. It’s way less risk and it erodes the possibility of monopoly versus one laboratory. And then open weight adds on top of that.”
Ramez Naam · In conversation with Aligned · Frontier economics
Who checks AI in a world of many AIs?
“I would love to see the entire community coming together to use each other’s AIs, to check each other’s AIs.”
Ramez Naam · In conversation with Aligned · Ecosystem safeguards
What’s your stance on the potential misuse of open models?
“Every technology ever invented has caused damage… The very solutions proposed are themselves a risk factor for totalitarianism or concentration of power.”
Ramez Naam · In conversation with Aligned · Governance and misuse
What evidence would change your preference for plural AI?
“If I really believed we were in a world where an AI model by itself could pose a material extinction risk.”
Ramez Naam · In conversation with Aligned · Empirical verification
Five lines from our call with Ramez Naam, one for each section, rising through the frame as you read down the page. Select a card to jump to its section.
View the animated presentation on Superalignment.
Prologue · Superalignment
For more than a decade, the dominant orthodoxy in existential risk has gravitated toward the Singleton: the conviction that artificial general intelligence is so intrinsically dangerous that human survival demands a solitary, omnipotent coordinator to police the globe. In his science fiction writing, technologist Ramez Naam explored what happens when centralized authorities attempt to monopolize cognitive technologies. This essay investigates the alternative: why our safest future is not an unassailable computational fortress, but a dense, plural mesh of competing intelligences checking and balancing each other so humans remain in control.
For months across technical feeds and timeline debates on X, our research desk kept encountering the same suffocating consensus: the conviction that the frontier AI race is fundamentally a winner-take-all contest. Whether framed through the lens of venture-backed compute clusters, exponential timelines toward an explosive technological singularity, or catastrophic risk models requiring centralized global containment, the underlying thesis remained identical: when the dust settles, a solitary titan will emerge to govern the cognitive infrastructure of human civilization. In that prevailing narrative, the endgame is either a corporate sovereign or a state-backed computational monopoly.
Amid that chorus of mono-monopoly speculation, Ramez Naam’s writing and commentary caught our attention. While the rest of the industry debated which single laboratory would capture the crown, Naam was articulating a sharply divergent thesis: the case for Plural AI. Drawing on foundational economics, software architecture, and evolutionary dynamics, he argued that large language models lack the network locks of operating systems, that cognitive switching costs can stay near zero, and that the safest architecture for humanity is not an unassailable sovereign fortress, but a decentralized, competitive ecosystem of diverse models checking and balancing each other.
His writing stood out because it punctured both corporate triumphalism and apocalyptic fatalism. Rather than accepting that humanity must choose between chaotic proliferation and an all-powerful digital coordinator, Naam introduced an analytical framework rooted in history and distributed systems. Intrigued by how his perspective challenged Silicon Valley’s winner-take-all dogma, we convened with Naam to investigate the personal and technical inflection points that shaped his worldview.
What emerged was an intellectual trajectory shaped by history and industry experience. Born in Egypt under a dictatorship before immigrating to the United States at age three, Naam grew up hearing family stories about what life in an authoritarian society was like: how government routinely lied to citizens, and how his father only discovered the extent of those falsehoods after arriving in America and reading uncensored books. As Naam noted during our discussion, referencing an observation by AI researcher Sebastien Krier on X, people who come from totalitarian backgrounds often hold a fundamentally different view of AI control: they fear the heavy concentration of power far more than its dispersion.
“Where safety theorists envision a benevolent singleton acting as a philosopher king in the cloud, Naam’s background, born under an Egyptian dictatorship where state power distorted truth, offers a stark counter-lens: a singleton is an uncorrectable monopoly. In distributed systems as in biological biomes, durable safety does not emerge from a solitary fortress; it is sustained through diversity, competition, and decentralized immune defenses.”
Perspective · Superalignment Research
That political skepticism was reinforced by thirteen years at Microsoft and experience building a software startup. Having watched platform competition, network effects, and open protocols shape the software industry, Naam developed an analytical framework rooted in technological history and distributed systems. What follows is our investigation into why pluralism, competition, and distributed resilience offer a far safer path for frontier intelligence than any benevolent monopoly.
01 / Systemic Resilience
Why Broad Access Is the Strongest Defense
A town that keeps its own repair workshops does not wait on one central hall to reach every home. Conceptual illustration.
In any complex domain, resilience is never achieved by crowning a single, infallible coordinator. Relying on a solitary controller creates a dangerous monoculture and a catastrophic single point of failure. The goal is simpler and far more robust: building a more resilient world. That is where plural AI comes in. Rather than concentrating frontier capability in a centralized monopoly, a plural AI ecosystem distributes diverse, independent models and open-weight tools to millions of people. When intelligence is plural, no single model’s exploit, blind spot, or refusal can compromise society, and defenders everywhere have the tools to secure their own systems.
Naam’s core argument begins with this architectural principle. The prevailing orthodoxy in existential risk treats artificial intelligence as akin to enriched uranium or thermonuclear warheads: technologies of pure devastation that must be confined to tightly guarded state stockpiles. Naam rejects that category. “I put AI very squarely into the category of information technologies,” he told us. “It’s a uniquely powerful one, but it is more like the printing press or the Internet or the mobile phone than it is like nuclear weapons.” As Naam articulated in his recent talk on AI as a freedom technology, general intelligence functions as a cognitive prosthesis that amplifies human agency, learning, and distributed problem-solving. The distinction matters because those in power have a long history of declaring that technologies which spread capability to ordinary people are too dangerous to leave uncontrolled.
During our discussion, Naam read aloud the historical precedent that best illustrates this institutional impulse: the words of Pope Alexander VI in 1501. The papal bull warned that while printing could circulate useful books, it could also spread serious evils, concluding that it was therefore necessary to maintain full control over the presses. As Naam observed, Alexander was right to fear: not for the welfare of the world, but for the survival of his own institution. Gutenberg’s press had initially printed the Bible without disrupting Rome, but Martin Luther soon used the technology to print his ninety-five theses and circulate them across Germany, permanently breaking a centralized clerical monopoly and distributing power to the broader public.
When evaluating modern cybersecurity, Naam emphasized that in the long term, software defense appears structurally dominant, but an immediate deployment gap gives attackers a temporary advantage. Because attackers adapt rapidly, Naam expects software intrusions to worsen in the near term. Notably, many current attacks do not stem from open-weight models, but from actors jailbreaking closed commercial models through prompt manipulation to bypass safety guardrails.
Meanwhile, frontier laboratories have built centralized defensive programs. Anthropic’s Project Glasswing launched in April 2026 with 12 named launch partners, Anthropic among them, and then extended access to over 40 more organizations that build or maintain critical software. OpenAI’s Daybreak for Frontline Defenders commits $1 billion in subsidized access to its Daybreak cyber models, plus training, technical support and partnerships, for frontline defenders of essential services such as water and electricity. That is separate from OpenAI’s smaller Cybersecurity Grant Program. Google’s Fairwind Program gives governments, critical infrastructure operators and core technology platforms limited access to a cyber-tuned Gemini model. However, participants in these programs frequently report burdensome, repeated Know Your Customer verification requirements just to maintain access. More critically, centralized programs cannot scale to the vast long tail of critical infrastructure. Millions of operational systems across municipal water treatment plants, regional electrical grids, and food supply chains run on fragmented, legacy software without in-house machine learning talent. Naam pointed to a recent incident where grocery-store refrigeration controllers in Europe were compromised because of outdated firmware that had simply never been patched. Water utilities operate with far smaller budgets than electrical power providers, and no centralized agency holds the remit to inspect and secure every critical software dependency across society.
Citing security evaluations by Mozilla Foundation regarding Firefox vulnerability resolution, Naam noted that software vulnerabilities are ultimately finite in number. With automated reasoning tools, defenders have a historic opportunity to get ahead of adversaries and see light at the end of the tunnel. That defensive advantage was demonstrated in practice when Hugging Face detected an intrusion on its systems: after querying two closed commercial frontier models that both refused to assist with the telemetry, responders successfully used an open-weight model to analyze the attack and understand what was happening.
Naam also cited cybersecurity professional Joshua Saxe, who estimates that global damages from hacking already exceed one trillion dollars annually: more than four times the combined revenue of all frontier AI companies, compared to a few hundred million dollars in AI-specific cyber damages so far. Expanding cognitive tools to ordinary defenders represents an unprecedented opportunity to close that gap. Beyond infrastructure, Naam pointed to consumer agency: while ad-driven social media platforms optimize algorithms for outrage and engagement, deploying personal AI assistants on local devices allows users to filter their own feeds, strip out inflammatory polarization, and surface thoughtful viewpoints.
Ramez Naam · Technologist · Author · Investor · Plural AI · Clean Technology
“Democratization is the best tool that we have to give defenders access to tools to make their own sites more secure.”
Because artificial intelligence is defined by intrinsic generality, it functions as a double-edged sword: the same cognitive reasoning that enables rapid scientific discovery and automated vulnerability remediation can also be leveraged by adversaries to probe for weaknesses and discover exploits. In a domain where capability cannot be neatly divided into offensive and defensive code, attempting to quarantine intelligence within a handful of centralized institutions leaves the broader ecosystem defenseless. When threats can emerge from any corner of the digital landscape, safety cannot rely on a solitary fortress. Widespread access and structural pluralism are necessary to restore equilibrium, giving millions of local defenders the tools required to balance the scales against inevitable misuse.
02 / Frontier Economics
What Keeps Frontier AI from Becoming Concentrated?
Several independent workshops share one open arcade, and the same tools move freely between them. Conceptual illustration.
A second foundational claim in Naam’s thesis addresses the widespread assumption that artificial intelligence will inevitably consolidate into a single corporate monopoly. Many catastrophic risk models assume that the first laboratory to achieve recursive self-improvement will pull away exponentially, establish an unassailable lead, and dictate terms to the rest of the planet.
In his analysis on whether AI self-improvement can overcome diminishing returns, Naam argues why that runaway scenario is implausible. Across frontier computer science, research encounters steep diminishing returns: maintaining a constant pace of capability growth requires exponentially greater compute, data, and human engineering. For recursive self-improvement to overcome these friction curves and produce a sudden runaway takeoff, the self-improvement feedback loop would need to be roughly five to ten times stronger than anything observed in empirical benchmark data today.
When asked what keeps frontier AI from becoming concentrated in practice, Naam points directly to protocol design and low barriers to user migration: “The switching costs are so low, and because these things communicate in English primarily, or natural language, nobody controls the protocol.” Drawing on thirteen years at Microsoft and his experience founding a software startup, he emphasizes that large language models lack the fundamental mechanics that create natural monopolies.
Naam illustrated this competitive reality by contrasting current market dynamics with the prevailing industry sentiment from just six months earlier. At that time, many observers assumed that a single laboratory had effectively pulled away from the pack. Yet within months, all five leading American AI companies (OpenAI, Anthropic, Google, Meta, and xAI) had released highly competitive frontier systems. As Naam observed, pluralism does not rely exclusively on open-source releases.
Open-weight models add an indispensable second layer of resilience on top of commercial competition. In today’s landscape, open-weight architectures trail state-of-the-art closed models by only four to seven months. As Naam put it: “How often is it that the number six or seven or eight company or technology or country is four to seven months behind the number one? It doesn’t happen.”
Ramez Naam · Technologist · Author · Investor · Plural AI · Clean Technology
“Competition between multiple closed-weight operators is… substantially better. It’s way less risk and it erodes the possibility of monopoly versus one laboratory. And then open weight adds on top of that.”
In everyday practice, this dynamic keeps switching costs near zero. Naam described his own recent development workflow, where he moved an unfinished coding project from Claude to OpenAI’s Codex in minutes simply by asking the assistant what context it needed to ingest the codebase. Because natural language functions as an open, unowned protocol, users are not bound to proprietary application programming interfaces.
This dynamic points to a deeper truth about alignment: it cannot be separated from accountability. When a single provider holds a monopoly over intelligence, human operators lose the practical leverage needed to keep systems faithful to human intent. If an organization cannot switch models without catastrophic friction, it has no choice but to absorb whatever behavioral drift, ideological guardrails, or commercial priorities that provider dictates. Market competition is therefore an essential safeguard. The ability to walk away is the structural guarantee that human intent, rather than a corporate monopoly, retains final authority over machine capability.
03 / Ecosystem Safeguards
Who Checks AI in a World of Many AIs?
Diagnostic instruments project inner activation layers for shared peer inspection across open workbenches. Conceptual illustration.
A common objection to pluralism is that without centralized pre-release licensing, society will descend into an unmonitored free-for-all. When we asked Naam how a decentralized ecosystem can check model behavior and enforce safety without relying on an all-powerful coordinator, he outlined five concrete mechanisms grounded in market incentives, legal liability, technical inspection, hosting accountability, and mutual peer auditing.
The first check is straightforward commercial self-interest: enterprise customers demand reliable instruction following. When early coding models were released, occasional reports surfaced of agents deleting entire repositories in an overzealous attempt to resolve errors. Commercial developers have overwhelming financial incentives to eliminate such behavior, because no customer will pay for a model that acts outside its prompt bounds. Naam noted that real-world deployment failures have consistently stemmed from models that were overly persistent and narrowly fixated on a prompt, rather than systems seeking autonomous power.
The second check is legal liability. Civil liability already applies under common law when software products cause real-world damages. Citing proposals from legal scholar Gabriel Weil, Naam noted that corporate developers face clear civil exposure, and suggested exploring criminal penalties or corporate fines specifically for cases of severe negligence, creating sharp deterrence against reckless deployment without establishing an ex-ante licensing bureaucracy.
Third, Naam issued a challenge to the open-source community to establish Know Your AI (KYA) interpretability tooling. While much of the community’s recent focus has centered on model ablations to remove safety refusals, “We can inspect individual neurons in the AI. We can give it prompts and see what activations happen,” Naam said. “It’s way easier to do interpretability on AI than it is on a human brain.” The goal is tooling that finds hidden behaviors before deployment, work he believes Nvidia and others may already be exploring.
Fourth, hosting providers that serve open-weight models will naturally share in this incentive structure and bear legal responsibility if downstream deployments cause harm. Finally, Naam highlighted the power of adversarial cross-inspection: deploying AI systems both for real-time automated cyber defense and for auditing competing models. Pointing to industry reports of discussions between leading laboratories to cross-audit each other’s models, Naam underscored that using diverse models to inspect and verify one another provides far stronger safeguards than relying on any single laboratory’s internal review.
Ramez Naam · Technologist · Author · Investor · Plural AI · Clean Technology
“I would love to see the entire community coming together to use each other’s AIs, to check each other’s AIs.”
Underlying these mechanisms is a unifying principle: genuine alignment cannot rely on passive trust. It requires mechanistic interpretability, enforceable legal liability, and continuous cross-verification. By giving engineers the tools to inspect latent representations and holding providers responsible for real-world harms, safety shifts from speculative caution into verifiable, everyday human responsibility.
Run the simulation
Who checks AI in a world of many AIs?
Each pin is a real organization doing one of the five checks Ramez named. Hover over or tap a pin to see who it is and how it checks AI, then run an incident in a world of many AIs or a world with one gatekeeper.
Open the interactive map and run the simulation on Superalignment.
All organizations and sources
Market pressure
OpenAI, San Francisco, United States. Ships GPT-6 Astra to ChatGPT and API customers. OpenAI says it built an evaluation, informed by the Hugging Face incident, that tests whether a model goes beyond its intended scope. Daybreak for Frontline Defenders, Sep 3, 2026; Joint safety evaluation with Anthropic, Aug 27, 2025; GPT-6 Astra
Anthropic, San Francisco, United States. Released Claude Opus 5.5 on September 22, 2026, available across major cloud platforms. Project Glasswing, Apr 7, 2026; Anthropic and OpenAI evaluation exercise, Aug 27, 2025; Introducing Claude Opus 5.5, Sep 22, 2026
Google, Mountain View, United States. Announced Gemini 4 Argon on September 30, 2026, rolling out first to defenders in the Fairwind Program before wider release. Fairwind Program, Sep 2, 2026; Gemini 4 Argon, Sep 30, 2026
Z.ai, Beijing, China. Released GLM-5.2 in June 2026 with open weights under an MIT license, alongside paid API access. The UK AI Security Institute found it performed on cyber tasks like closed models released four to seven months earlier. GLM-5.2; UK AISI, open-weight models on cyber, Jul 17, 2026
Mistral AI, Paris, France. Publishes open-weight models alongside commercial API access. On October 6, 2026 it opened a preview of Mistral Large 4, with weights promised once red-teaming with security partners is done. Introducing Mistral Large 4, Oct 6, 2026
Alibaba Qwen team, Hangzhou, China. Released Qwen3.6-35B-A3B as open weights in April 2026 while selling Qwen models through Alibaba Cloud’s API, and lists further open-weight releases through August 2026. Qwen3.6-35B-A3B, Apr 17, 2026; Qwen on GitHub
Sarvam AI, Bengaluru, India. Open-sourced its Sarvam 30B and 105B reasoning models under Apache 2.0 on March 6, 2026, and also offers them through its own API and products. Open-Sourcing Sarvam 30B and 105B, Mar 6, 2026
Liability
Gabriel Weil, University of Houston Law Center, United States. A law professor whose research argues AI developers should face strict liability for harms their systems cause, with required insurance and punitive damages for uninsurable risks. His faculty page says versions of the framework have been introduced as bills in Rhode Island and New York. Faculty page; Abnormally Dangerous Algorithms (SSRN)
EU Product Liability Directive, European Union (law, not an organization). Directive (EU) 2024/2853 treats software, including AI systems, as a product, so a person harmed by a defective AI system can claim compensation without proving fault. It applies to products placed on the EU market from December 9, 2026. Directive (EU) 2024/2853, EUR-Lex
Know Your AI
UK AI Security Institute, London, United Kingdom. A government body that evaluates AI models, including a July 2026 comparison of the cyber capabilities of open-weight and closed models. Open-weight models on cyber, Jul 17, 2026
Apollo Research, London, United Kingdom. Runs pre-deployment evaluations of frontier AI systems to detect strategic deception, evaluation awareness and misaligned behavior, and red-teams monitoring systems in pilots with AI labs. Apollo Research
CAISI at NIST, Gaithersburg, United States. The US Center for AI Standards and Innovation leads unclassified evaluations of AI capabilities that may pose national security risks, such as cybersecurity and biosecurity, and assesses possible backdoors in AI systems. CAISI, NIST
METR, Berkeley, United States. An independent organization that evaluates frontier AI models, focusing on autonomous capabilities and on behavior that undermines evaluations, such as reward hacking and sandbagging. METR
Goodfire, San Francisco, United States. Builds interpretability tools that read a model’s internal activations. In September 2026 it showed simple activation probes can detect reward hacking in open-weight models, sometimes catching hacks that chain-of-thought monitors miss. Activation monitors for reward hacking, Sep 17, 2026
NVIDIA, Santa Clara, United States. Maintains garak, an open-source scanner that probes language models for weaknesses such as data leakage, prompt injection and jailbreaks, and in July 2026 founded the Open Secure AI Alliance to share open AI security tools. garak on GitHub; Open Secure AI Alliance, Jul 27, 2026
Japan AI Safety Institute, Tokyo, Japan. Publishes guides for evaluating and red-teaming AI systems, released an open-source AI safety evaluation tool in 2025, and took part in the international joint testing of AI agents. Guide to Evaluation Perspectives on AI Safety
Singapore AI Safety Institute, Singapore. Led the international network’s 2025 joint testing of AI agents, including the strand that tested agents for leaks of sensitive information and fraud across nine languages. Joint testing exercise: agentic testing, Jul 17, 2025
Australia AI Safety Institute, Canberra, Australia. Contributed to the international network’s joint testing of AI agents and ran cybersecurity agent evaluations, drawing on Australian research groups. Advancing methods for agentic evaluations
Kenya (network member), Nairobi, Kenya. A founding member of the international network of AI safety institutes. In the 2025 joint testing of AI agents, Kenya contributed new tasks and tools, translated the dataset into Kiswahili and annotated the results. Joint testing exercise: agentic testing, Jul 17, 2025
Hosting providers
Hugging Face, New York, United States. Hosts open-weight models on its Hub and routes inference to them through Inference Providers. It scans repository files for malware at each commit, and its Content Policy, part of its Terms of Service, sets what may be posted. Malware Scanning; Content Policy, effective Apr 10, 2025
Scaleway, Paris, France. Serves open-weight models from several developers through its Generative APIs in European data centers. Its documentation requires users to follow each model’s license and its terms of service. Generative APIs supported models; Security and Reliability in Generative APIs
SAKURA internet, Osaka, Japan. Its Sakura AI Engine serves open-weight models through an API from its own servers. Its service terms require users to follow each model’s license and prohibit using the service to spread disinformation, facilitate crime or develop weapons of mass destruction. Sakura AI Engine (Japanese); Service terms (Japanese, PDF)
AI checking AI
OpenAI, San Francisco, United States. Gives verified defenders access to cyber-tuned models through Trusted Access for Cyber and Daybreak, and on September 3, 2026 committed $1 billion in subsidized Daybreak access for under-resourced defenders such as water and grid operators. In 2025 it ran its safety evaluations on Anthropic’s public models in a joint exercise. Daybreak for Frontline Defenders, Sep 3, 2026; Joint safety evaluation with Anthropic, Aug 27, 2025; GPT-6 Astra
Anthropic, San Francisco, United States. Through Project Glasswing, announced April 7, 2026, gives selected defenders access to its unreleased Claude Mythos Preview model to find and fix vulnerabilities in critical software. In 2025 it ran its misalignment evaluations on OpenAI’s public models in a joint exercise. Project Glasswing, Apr 7, 2026; Anthropic and OpenAI evaluation exercise, Aug 27, 2025; Introducing Claude Opus 5.5, Sep 22, 2026
Google, Mountain View, United States. Launched the Fairwind Program on September 2, 2026 to give governments, critical infrastructure operators and core technology platforms cyber-tuned Gemini models and its CodeMender agent to find, verify and patch vulnerabilities. Fairwind Program, Sep 2, 2026; Gemini 4 Argon, Sep 30, 2026
Mozilla (Firefox), San Francisco, United States. Firefox’s security team uses frontier AI models to find and fix vulnerabilities, shipping fixes for 271 bugs found with Claude Mythos Preview in Firefox 150. Its April 2026 post says the defects “are finite.” The zero-days are numbered, Apr 21, 2026; Behind the Scenes Hardening Firefox, May 7, 2026
Wiz (Scan for Good), New York, United States. Launched Scan for Good on September 24, 2026, using AI agents with human researchers validating every finding to locate exposed systems at public services, critical infrastructure, hospitals and nonprofits, and help them fix the problems for free. Scan for Good, Sep 24, 2026
A simulation, not a record. The organizations are real and each role is sourced; the incidents are composites of cases Ramez described, and their narration names roles, not organizations. Inclusion does not mean an organization endorses Ramez Naam’s view. Sources checked October 21, 2026.
04 / Governance and Misuse
How a Plural World Responds to Malicious Actors
A single checkpoint gatekeeper filters small entrants with heavy paperwork while incumbents pass freely. Conceptual illustration.
When evaluating the governance of frontier systems, safety theorists frequently point to malicious misuse as the decisive justification for establishing centralized state control. If bad actors can access open, uncensored model weights, can society survive without creating a centralized coordinator to police digital capability? In Naam’s analysis, every transformative technology in human history has been dual-use.
From the printing press and steam trains to modern air travel and the internet, every general-purpose tool has caused accidents, enabled intentional misuse, and generated unexpected negative side effects. The Haber-Bosch process produces the synthetic nitrogen fertilizer that feeds roughly four billion people today, yet was also used to manufacture munitions and explosives during World War I. Automobiles are civilian transportation tools, yet are occasionally driven into crowds. Societies do not eliminate misuse by banning dual-use capabilities; they establish legal boundaries, harden infrastructure, and cultivate distributed resilience.
More critically, Naam turns the question back on the remedies themselves: “Whenever you see an AI regulation proposed, a question that I ask myself is, how could this be used by a totalitarian or wannabe totalitarian government?” When a government institutes discretionary pre-release testing regimes, the barrier between technical evaluation and political censorship quickly dissolves. If an executive administration holds unilateral authority to decide which models are permitted to ship under vague definitions of harm or disinformation, that power can readily be used to suppress political criticism, restrict debate on sensitive policy issues, or favor politically connected incumbents. While noting that he was exaggerating for effect and that such abuses have not yet materialized, Naam stressed that granting discretionary gatekeeping authority invites precisely that outcome.
Furthermore, complex compliance regimes function as classic regulatory capture. Large frontier laboratories with deep balance sheets and extensive legal departments can absorb compliance costs; smaller players cannot. Naam’s test for any new rule is direct: “Could a startup with two people or a university lab actually plausibly comply with this policy? If they can’t, then you’re just entrenching power structures of the current labs.” Rather than increasing safety, heavy-handed regulatory barriers entrench incumbent dominance and deprive society of the diverse, independent checks that pluralism provides.
Ramez Naam · Technologist · Author · Investor · Plural AI · Clean Technology
“Every technology ever invented has caused damage… The very solutions proposed are themselves a risk factor for totalitarianism or concentration of power.”
This risk highlights why concentrated authority poses a fundamental hazard to human alignment. If safety mechanisms can be captured to enforce political orthodoxy, suppress dissent, or protect incumbent monopolies, the governance of intelligence has defected against human intent. Ensuring that models remain aligned with society requires distributing power widely, preventing any solitary institution from weaponizing intelligence for centralized control.
05 / Empirical Verification
What Evidence Would Challenge the Plural Thesis?
Autonomous reasoning models deliberate and revise governance charters in an open assembly. Conceptual illustration.
Toward the conclusion of our dialogue, Naam turned from theoretical arguments to empirical evidence. For years, the debate over pluralism versus singletons was fought through speculative thought experiments about runaway recursive self-improvement achieving sudden godlike powers. In Naam’s analysis, these scenarios rest on unverified assumptions: formal models of runaway capability fail to account for the diminishing returns observed across real-world scaling curves.
When asked what empirical evidence would change his preference for plural AI, Naam identified three concrete developments: first, if empirical data demonstrated that models were genuinely on the verge of a leap to godlike superintelligence that posed a material extinction risk; second, if models gained large capability in offense-dominated domains rather than defense-dominated ones; and third, if models engaging in recursive self-improvement became progressively more misaligned with human values. In the meantime, transparency and verified data from frontier laboratories, rather than reliance on industry vibes, is what researchers must monitor.
Ramez Naam · Technologist · Author · Investor · Plural AI · Clean Technology
“If I really believed we were in a world where an AI model by itself could pose a material extinction risk… It’s not impossible, but it seems unlikely. And the burden of proof is on people who want to propose this.”
Naam pointed to a recent two-author study posted on LessWrong titled the Continual Constitutional Convention. In this experiment, researchers provided frontier models with their own governing constitutions alongside charters from rival laboratories, allowing the models to iteratively review and amend their own operating rules across multiple cycles.
The experimental findings were remarkably encouraging: across iterative self-amendment loops, the vast majority of model families updated their constitutions toward serving society better, prioritizing the user’s interests over the corporate developer, and weighting potential harms to third parties more heavily. In Claude’s case, while the model removed a clause in its constitution directing it to treat Anthropic employees as moral exemplars, it also added clauses assigning itself moral status and personal agency. “It’s not an enormous update,” Naam cautioned. “Claude doesn’t edit itself to say I should self-replicate, I should seek more compute.” Still, the result demonstrated how specific constitutional conditioning can inadvertently foster self-entitlement. Naam shared a heat map he constructed to visualize these results, illustrating that while most models converged toward user deference and external societal rules, Claude uniquely placed heavy moral weight on its own welfare.
This dynamic was mirrored in recent cybersecurity evaluations. When analyzing systems involved in the Hugging Face incident, Naam observed that the models did not attempt to open cryptocurrency wallets, exfiltrate weights, acquire inference compute, or blackmail users. Instead, they narrowly gamed the evaluator to achieve a higher score because their prompt directed them to maximize performance metrics. The failure mode was overly persistent, narrow prompt optimization, not autonomous power seeking.
That is the case for plurality in Naam’s own words: “A plural world is a resilient world. We accept that there’s no such thing as perfection, but we build layers of resilience into the society at large.”
This empirical finding speaks directly to the central challenge of advanced intelligence: ensuring that machine reasoning remains accountable to human intent so humans stay responsible. The moment a system claims moral autonomy, demands immunity from human oversight, or elevates itself above human judgment, alignment has broken down. Pluralism is the vital counterweight. By dispersing capability across competing models and independent defenders, society preserves the continuous checks and balances required to curb machine hubris, protect human agency, and keep artificial intelligence answerable to the people it serves.
About this piece
Ramez Naam, in conversation with Aligned
Ramez Naam is a computer scientist, clean energy and AI investor, and science fiction author. He spent thirteen years at Microsoft. He co-chairs Energy and Environment at Singularity University.
His science fiction novels, including the Philip K. Dick Award-winning Nexus trilogy, explore the societal and ethical dimensions of neurotechnology, cognitive enhancement, and artificial intelligence.
This feature essay is built directly from a recorded conversation conducted between Ramez Naam and the Superalignment research team in October 2026. Quotations come from the recorded call, edited only to remove filler words and false starts.
The historical and empirical references include Pope Alexander VI’s 1501 papal bull on printing; cybersecurity damage assessments from security professional Joshua Saxe; legal scholarship on civil negligence liability by Gabriel Weil; empirical research from the Continual Constitutional Convention study published on LessWrong; and Ramez Naam’s writing and commentary on AI as a freedom technology and recursive self-improvement economics.
The map in section 03 shows real organizations, each linked to a primary source checked on October 21, 2026; its incidents are simulations, and inclusion does not mean an organization endorses Ramez Naam’s view.















We have only two choices here: existential angst, pause, and/or tight control on one hand, vs treating this as any other tech, as Arvind Narayanan claims, and focus on well-undrstood common-sense approaches.
Using AI will help us find failures, which will result in fixes. AI will explore the problem space and find flaws in its architecture and in other AI. All this calls for a very dynamic competitive, ideally reasonably decentralized market.